|  The future poses challenges for an intelligent international trade strategy 
        for developing countries, including those in our geographical region, 
        on at least three levels. These are challenges that will require an improvement 
        in the efficiency of the quality of diagnosis of the profound changes 
        that are taking place in different countries, and not just of the current 
        situation.  One of these levels is that of the multilateral world trade system. The 
        existing institutions and rules, which some consider to be obsolete, will 
        require a redesign effort that will not be easy to achieve. The second 
        is the inter-regional level. In the stage that has begun to develop in 
        trade relations between nations, assertive insertion in the growing network 
        of inter-regional agreements will be key to projecting to the world what 
        a country can offer to other markets. Finally, the third is the Latin 
        American regional level. After sixty years of various initiatives aimed 
        at economic integration, physical connectivity and productive linkages 
        between countries of the region, there is a growing awareness of the need 
        for different approaches and working methods than those employed to date. As we have pointed out on other occasions, Mercosur itself is in need 
        of updating, which may require significant methodological changes, while 
        preserving the fundamental reasons that led the founding countries to 
        decide to work together to achieve their economic and social development 
        goals in a context of peace and political stability in the "neighborhood". 
        Its relations with the countries of the Pacific Alliance, which in some 
        cases are intense and in all cases very necessary, as well as with the 
        other countries of the region, will require taking full advantage of the 
        institutional framework of ALADI, which is not always used, in order to 
        increase trade and economic relations among its member countries, or at 
        least among those most interested. In any case, there is now a tendency to design, through governmental 
        negotiations, new institutional frameworks to promote international trade 
        and productive integration, as well as to redesign existing ones in order 
        to adapt them to the continuous changes in economic and political realities. 
       Many of these frameworks are bilateral, involving countries belonging 
        to different regions in the international system. Some are regional in 
        scope and have been developed with different modalities and intensities 
        in recent decades. Such is the case of Mercosur, the Pacific Alliance, 
        ASEAN and the EU. In general, they have a clear political scope stemming 
        from the fact that the countries that constitute them share a geographic 
        space. Others have an inter-regional scope and involve countries or blocs 
        of countries, even if only a few are connected to each other. And there 
        always remains the task of redesigning the global framework institutionalized 
        in the WTO.  Designing and negotiating new modalities of agreements and adapting those 
        that come from another era will not be easy. It is a task in which the 
        logic of power, the logic of economics and even the logic of legality 
        interact in a way that is sometimes difficult to grasp. Understanding 
        such interplay is key to understanding and operating on concrete realities. This is not an easy task, moreover, because categories and concepts from 
        other historical moments are often used. As we pointed out above, these 
        have been overtaken, at least in some cases, by the profound changes observed 
        in recent years, both in the distribution of world power and, in particular, 
        in the modalities of international trade in goods and services-largely 
        as a consequence of the disruptive effects of technological change and 
        the phenomenon of consumer empowerment of the new urban middle class in 
        many developing countries-and in transnational investment.  In the case of the countries of the Latin American region, the main fronts 
        of international trade negotiations offer complementary options. Reflecting 
        on these options and their relative costs is one of the priorities of 
        any strategic thought exercise on international integration of any given 
        country. In what Professor Amitav Acharya has called a "multiplex" 
        world, a good understanding of the options and their relative costs is 
        essential when developing a strategy for the country's international trade 
        integration, including negotiations with other countries or economic blocs. A first front of action required is the necessary adaptation of each 
        regional agreement, as in the case of Mercosur, to the new world realities 
        and to those of its own member countries, in some cases in a full and 
        complex evolution. It is not a matter of relapsing into the refounding 
        syndrome, which has occurred with some frequency almost always coinciding 
        with changes of government in some of the larger economic partners. It 
        may be more practical, effective and therefore advisable to practice the 
        art of metamorphosis. That is, to make gradual changes that allow us to 
        capitalize on the experience gained-and the results obtained-and to introduce 
        the changes deemed necessary. This is all the more advisable when a process of integration between 
        countries faces not only an existential crisis, but also a methodological 
        crisis in the development of the common work of the participating nations. 
        And this seems to be the case with Mercosur today. No member country has 
        raised the idea of withdrawing from the political, economic and legal 
        pact that binds it to its partners, at least not openly. This is tantamount 
        to admitting that none of the partners has a definite Plan B.  A conceivable alternative plan, such as transforming Mercosur into a 
        free trade area -in the sense of Article XXIV of the GATT-WTO-by abolishing 
        the Common External Tariff (CET), could have some high political and also 
        economic costs, especially in the trade of manufactured goods. It would 
        imply a modification of the Treaty of Asunción. It would be up 
        to each country to decide whether or not it would be convenient for them 
        to face these costs. It should be borne in mind that the elimination of 
        the CET, or its open violation, could have a potential negative impact 
        on the commitment made to ensure free trade between the partners, as a 
        consequence of the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty of Asunción 
        (reciprocity of rights and obligations).  A second front of action is that of convergence in diversity in the Latin 
        American regional space. This was the strategy proposed at the time by 
        the government of President Michelle Bachelet and discussed at a meeting 
        with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
        Trade of the countries of Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, held at the 
        Palacio de la Moneda in Santiago, Chile, on November 24, 2014. It was 
        clear then that what was proposed was not an integration agreement between 
        the two schemes, but the need to develop roadmaps that would lead to the 
        establishment of multiple communicating vessels between the processes 
        of productive transformation and international insertion of countries 
        belonging to both blocs and not necessarily all of them. It was also acknowledged 
        that the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, which created LAIA, provides an institutional 
        framework and instruments that are more than appropriate and even underutilized 
        (such as, among others, the different types of partial scope agreements) 
        to implement the strategy proposed and shared by the countries of the 
        region.  A third front is that of global negotiations and negotiations with large 
        regional spaces. The protracted negotiations between the EU and Mercosur 
        illustrate the difficulties they sometimes entail. It is possible to foresee 
        that the countries that currently make up the Mercosur customs union-which 
        are the founding partners-will also advance initiatives aimed at expanding 
        the negotiating agenda with other large economic areas, such as China, 
        Japan and India in Asia, and the United States and Canada in North America. 
       On the three fronts mentioned above, Mercosur countries and their Latin 
        American partners could promote new approaches to the characteristics 
        of the trade agreements they negotiate. Perhaps they should be called 
        "strategic trade and investment promotion agreements". They 
        could not be limited to the level of tariffs, but should cover issues 
        that affect productive investment decisions and technological cooperation 
        oriented to transnational trade. The impact of such agreements on trade 
        and transnational investment involving companies from countries in the 
        region could be threefold: to promote the effect of creating stable jobs; 
        to ensure the fluidity and predictability of trade transactions, investment 
        and technological cooperation; and to maintain a sufficient degree of 
        flexibility in trade policies to deal with complex economic conditions 
        and pronounced uncertainties, for example by using different types of 
        escape clauses with impartial custodians. All of this will undoubtedly mean a liberation from concepts and paradigms 
        that come from a world that, as we have said, is rapidly being overtaken 
        by new realities. |